Expert's Commentaries

Standoff. Aftermath

Russia has completed its peace enforcement operation on the territory of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia. The country’s political leaders and military commanders have announced that they are withdrawing troops from the conflict zone. It is still too soon to speak about an end to the conflict between Georgia and the unrecognised republics, but the results of Russia’s military operation can already be summed up. Likewise we can analyse the results of certain processes taking place in the world and consider possible future developments. 
 

So, the contradictions that have been building up between Russia and the West, especially the United States, since the late 1990s, have erupted to the surface. The masks of beatific political correctness and cooperation in the global war on terror have come off. What we are witnessing is the start of a new spiral in history: the story of confrontation between two superpowers, each trying to build the world as it sees fit. Like every avalanche, this one began with a snowflake: Georgia’s attempt to establish “constitutional order” in South Ossetia. That operation merits a closer look. The sweeping term “establishing constitutional order” can mean almost diametrically opposite things at different historical junctures.

Nevertheless, there are some basic characteristics common to every operation that claims that name. To what extent did Georgia’s operation to restore constitutional order in South Ossetia meet these characteristics? The first characteristic is selective fire on illegal armed units and minimisation of civilian casualties. Obviously, this operation does not qualify: the Georgian artillery shelled Tskhinval and the surrounding villages, and many facts of murder and violence against civilians have been documented.

The second and equally important characteristic is the humanitarian component, namely, a commitment to early restoration of law and order and life support for civilians in the combat area. That includes setting up medical centres, field hospitals, and creating stocks of food, water and other essential necessities in the area to ease the suffering of innocent civilians during a military operation. Georgia did none of these things. On balance, Georgia’s actions before and during the invasion of South Ossetia suggest that the aim of the Georgian leadership was to exterminate South Ossetia’s non-Georgian population or cause it to flee to Russia. Under the Russian Criminal Code such actions are described as genocide.

In addition, Georgia directly violated international laws by opening fire on Russian peacekeeping units, and what is more, Georgian peacekeepers took part in action. Based on these combined characteristics, the Russian response to the shelling and subsequent invasion by Georgian troops, which began in the early hours of August 8, 2008, was absolutely legitimate: units of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District moved to help the peacekeepers. As early as August 8 there were the first reports of air strikes on Georgian troops. Many military experts believe that without these raids the South Ossetian militia would not have beaten off the first assault on Tskhinval.

After midday Russian ground troops began to be deployed in the city area and the first manoeuvre forces approached Tskhinval and engaged in fighting.

A “distribution of roles” took shape: the fighting in the towns and villages was done by the local militia and volunteers, while Russian troops only engaged with more or less large Georgian army groups that were more than a match to the militia. Russia also undertook to suppress the Georgian artillery, and the Russian Air Force launched strikes on Georgia’s logistical infrastructure. Russian special units were set the task to counter Georgian commando raids. According to available information Russian special units prevented Georgian saboteurs from blowing up the Roki Tunnel, the main link between Russia and South Ossetia.

The destruction of the tunnel would have greatly complicated operations, as other roads do not have sufficient capacity. Fighting in the Tskhinval area lasted for three days and nights, by the end of which Georgian artillery was either destroyed or had left its positions from which it could shell the city, and Georgian ground troops pulled out of the city. Throughout the operation the Russian Army was bound by a number of political restrictions that prevented it from using heavy weaponry against residential areas, which limited its capacity to neutralise artillery batteries.

Throughout the operation, until August 12 inclusive, the Russian Air Force bombarded Georgian military infrastructure to prevent its Armed Forces from continuing the war. The Navy was also involved in the operation: a group of Black Sea Fleet ships patrolled the coasts of Abkhazia and Georgia. By August 11 the Georgian Army ceased to exist as an organised force: pictures of the flight of Georgian troops from South Ossetia, Gori and other regions were shown throughout the world. The troops escaped to the south, mainly to the Tbilisi area, abandoning their vehicles and equipment. Meanwhile the Russian Armed Forces, jointly with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian units, took the fighting into Georgia proper, seizing abandoned armour and destroying what remained of the military infrastructure.

On August 12 Dmitry Medvedev announced that the operation was complete. The five day war revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian Army. On the one hand, the speedy deployment, the methodical and planned way in which it destroyed Georgian artillery and infrastructure, the success of its anti-sabotage actions and the quick disintegration of the Georgian Army testify in favour of the Russian command and staff at all levels. On the other hand, some shortcomings came to light: the Georgian anti-aircraft systems and Air Force were not fully neutralised, the army units lacked modern weapons and vehicles, and communications were obviously obsolescent. The Russian military command admitted some of the shortcomings: Colonel-General Nogovitsyn, who covered the Russian actions for the press throughout the operation, admitted that the loss of a Tu-22MR bomber had exposed shortcomings in the Air Force personnel training. In parallel with the military operation, an information and diplomatic war was unfolding, as the Russian representatives at the UN and NATO, Vitaly Churkin and Dmitry Rogozin, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the Russian prime minister and president appeared on all television channels defending Russia’s position and substantiating its actions. Combined with the practically unanimous position of the Russian media, it enabled Russia to avoid the same unqualified defeat in the information war that it invariably suffered in the past 20 years.

Russia had supporters even in Western Europe. In fact only the United States, Britain and some East European countries unreservedly backed Georgia, and that support did not go beyond words of sympathy and demands that Russia immediately pull out its troops. Thus the West demonstrated to the whole world that it was not united on such a fundamental issue as the “defence of a young democracy.”

A new geopolitical reality came into being: a bloc – if only a temporary one – of Russia and Western Europe (Germany, France, Italy and partly Spain) against the United States and East European countries. Even Russia’s traditional geopolitical adversary, Turkey, expressed support for Russia. The Turkish premier, who flew to Moscow for talks, backed Russia’s efforts to restore peace in the region. Later reports said that Turkey had refused to allow American naval ships into the Black Sea.

But despite these successes, Russia can hardly claim to have won the information war: the opposing flood of information was too powerful. Most likely the outcome of the information war can be described as a tie. It is hard to predict how the situation will develop. The positions of the main players in the world arena – in this case unquestionably Russia and the United States – look irreconcilable. Russia is clearly seeking recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and a criminal investigation initiated by the Russian law enforcement bodies on charges of genocide implies the responsibility of those who initiated the operation from the Georgian side, including its leaders. Neighbouring countries have also been drawn into the conflict: one such country is Ukraine, where there are clear signs of a deepening political crisis. While recognising that any forecast in this volatile situation is sure to be inaccurate and most probably wrong, one can still try to predict the overall directions in which the situation may develop. Obviously, the past two weeks have changed the world dramatically: the contradictions between Russia and the United States that for a long time were hidden behind the veil of political correctness have come to the fore. Neither Russia nor the United States intends to yield ground, which suggests a new spiral of the Cold War and global confrontation between the two powers from the post-Soviet space to Latin America.

The fact that the US missile defence system is directed against Russia became obvious after Poland hastily agreed to deploy US interceptor missiles in exchange for modern air defence systems to protect against a hypothetical Russian strike. In turn, Russian officials reiterated their warning that in the event of a conflict the deployment sites of the missile defence systems would be the priority targets. As for the region itself, one may expect to see another change of power in Georgia in the foreseeable future. Mikheil Saakashvili, who has lost the war and whose personal behaviour was far from impeccable, is unpopular in his country and in the West. One should not however entertain illusions that pro-Russian forces will win: their present position in Georgian society is too weak to hope for immediate success.

One may also see a dismantling of the CIS in its present form, as Russia’s allies will probably strengthen cooperation within the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which may soon have new members.

Saakashvili Punished, US Humiliated 

Jan Carnogursky was First Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia in 1989–1990, Prime Minister of Slovakia in 1991-92 and Justice Minister of Slovakia in 1998-2002 

By attacking South Ossetia Georgia violated international law in the shape of the Russian-Georgian Treaty signed in Sochi on June 24, 1992. The Treaty envisaged a ceasefire between Ossetians and Georgians in South Ossetia and the adjacent areas. The conflict was triggered, or at least intensified, by the decision taken by Georgia’s President Zviad Gamsakhurdia in 1991 to abolish South Ossetia’s autonomy within Georgia. In addition, Georgia was waging a local war in Abkhazia, which had also been stripped of its autonomy, and in Adjaria. It was too many wars for the new lyin dependent Georgia to wage.

The Georgian army had to pull out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to give way to a mixed Russian-Georgian peacekeeping force deployed on the ceasefire line. A ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia was signed in 1994. Both agreements had been approved by the UN Security Council and thus became part of international law. Mikheil Saakashvili broke the agreement with South Ossetia by ordering the Georgian troops to attack. Georgia also violated humanitarian and moral principles. The city of Tskhinval is situated in a valley surrounded by low hills.

The Georgian army, trained by the United States, took up positions on the hills. Late at night on August 7 and in the early hours of August 8 it attacked the city with artillery and tanks and – in a particularly cruel move – with updated Katyusha rockets called Grad. Even before the attack they shelled villages close to the border with Georgia from Georgian territory. South Ossetia had to evacuate children and old people from these areas almost a week before the offensive. Many Ossetian villages were razed to the ground. Not a single undamaged building remained in Tskhinval.

Tskhinval was a peaceful city with no military facilities. The Georgian offensive should be seen as an attack on civilians. According to Russian and Ossetian data, more than 2,100 people, mainly civilians, died as a result of the Georgian offensive. These figures are matched by the scale of devastation in the city and no one has yet managed to refute them. Such a large number of civilian casualties qualifies as a war crime. Ossetians have always considered themselves to be a people apart from Georgians. Both nations are Christian, and in 1801 they voluntarily became part of the Russian Empire. Throughout the 18th century and earlier they were repressed by the Muslim empires of Turkey and Persia.

In the Soviet Union South Ossetia was an autonomy within Georgia. The keynote of Mikheil Saakashvili’s electoral campaign was restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia, that is, the occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Georgian attack was aimed at quick occupation of South Ossetia and the creation of an “accomplished fact” to be followed by prolonged negotiations that would lead nowhere.

Ossetians were hiding from the Georgian army in basements and fleeing to Russia in tens of thousands. No one except the Russian Army could stop Georgia’s plan of occupation of South Ossetia and protect the Ossetian people. The Russian Army did it, and it did it effectively. It was not enough to push the Georgian Army back behind the former ceasefire line. The attack could have been repeated.

Out of military tactical considerations the Georgian Army had to be driven into the hinterland of the country. The Russian Army did that very effectively. Sitting here in Central Europe, it is hard to judge specific operations or the movements of Russian units on Georgian territory. But there is no need for that. On the whole, the Russian military response to the Georgian offensive on South Ossetia was justified and proportionate. Western politicians and our media have been using double standards with regard to the conflict over South Ossetia. Let us draw just some comparisons.

Our media still blame the Serbs for the liquidation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989. But there was next to nothing in our media about the abolition of South Ossetia’s autonomy in 1991. Slobodan Milosevic was tried by the Hague Tribunal for shelling Sarajevo and Vukovar, and when General Ratko Mladic is caught it will be undoubtedly one of the charges against him. Our press says nothing about Saakashvili’s order to shell Tskhinval with Grad multiple-launch rocket systems. The secession of Kosovo and its independence have been recognised by the majority of Western countries, which, however, consider Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia to be a legitimate measure to restore constitutional order in Georgia. Albanians have evicted Serbs from Kosovo after Western air raids, and those Serbs are still unable to return to their homes. Western leaders and the media say nothing about it.

The Dutch soldiers who performed a peacekeeping mission in Srebrenica are still, and justly, blamed for failing to protect the Muslims. When the Russian Army responded to the violation of peace by Georgia and protected Ossetians and restored peace, it was described as an aggression. While more than 2,100 civilians died as a result of the Georgian attack, the media merely say that “by ordering to shell Tskhinvali, Mikheil Saakashvili obviously made a mistaken or foolish move” (Peter Schutz). The Georgian president launched the attack on South Ossetia because he was counting on American help. After all, the United States had been training his army and openly arming it since 2002.

The Georgian military budget increased 30 times over since 2002. After the lightning-swift response of the Russian Army the US was unable to do anything. Even Turkey, America’s ally and a NATO member, sided with Russia. The US wants to expel Russia from the G8 and block its accession to the World Trade Organisation. But these organisations n eed Russia more than it needs them. Russia has the richest natural resources in the world and it will be able to use them exclusively by its own rules.

One feels sad writing about the decline of American foreign policy. The US has defended Europe against communism and this writer would have gladly written about it with respect. The most tragic mistake is the intention to put Georgia on a fast track to join NATO. If Georgia again attacks South Ossetia or Abkhazia and shells peaceful cities and villages with Grad rocket launchers, and the Russian Army again rises in their defense, will our soldiers agree to fight on the Georgia’s side? If so, let us make sure that present-day commentators will be the first to go to fight the Russian Army: for example, Slovak commentators from the newspaper SME and Czech commentators from MF Dnes, Lidove Noviny, Respekt and Reflex. August 26

It is High Time the West Learnt to See Reality 

Unfortunately, after concluding that it has won the Cold War (which in itself is a serious delusion) the West has come to regard itself as infallible and has become convinced that only its own political system has the right to exist. It has proclaimed itself to be the “world boss” and the “civilised world”. It declares that any disagreement with its position “flouts freedom and democracy”. Such behaviour in itself is a far cry from the principles of freedom and democracy. 

The West flatly refuses to admit that Russia is behaving with regard to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in exactly the same way as the West has done with regard to Kosovo. Even the rhetoric is the same. The West seems to be convinced that the Kosovo case is “unique” and cannot be a precedent for other unrecognised states.

Any unbiased observer can see that the Western claims that Kosovo is a “unique case” do not hold water as the case is anything but unique. The Kremlin sees Kosovo, as well as the “colour revolutions” in the CIS countries, as part of the West’s drive to expand its spheres of influence by all available means. For example, although the revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia had considerable popular support in those countries, their legitimacy and absence of outside interference are questionable, to put it mildly. NATO’s actions in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 are classic examples of a military aggression as defined by international law.

The Russian reaction to NATO’s advance to the East and the stationing of elements of American missile defence in Eastern Europe has traces of paranoia about it. An unbiased observer cannot but see the progressive military enfeeblement of NATO, as witnessed by the constant cuts of its troop strength, but, more importantly, by a widespread reluctance among Europeans to fight. Even so, Moscow sees these Western actions as an expansion of its sphere of influence. But in any case it is the West that has since the end of the Cold War totally neglected international law and sought to expand its sphere of influence by all available means. Naturally, the Kremlin has concluded that this is the most effective kind of policy. Moscow does not take seriously the Western rhetoric about establishing freedom and democracy. For example, in Eastern Europe democracy was established independently of those countries’ accession to NATO and the EU.

And one has to be totally out of touch with reality to consider today’s Kosovo and Iraq to be democratic states. Even in Ukraine, which is more democratic than Russia, many people see democracy merely as the sway of corruption and political chaos. Confident as it is that it is always right and infallible, the West is un able to adequately assess the situation in the post-Soviet space. It still believes that in the Russian Empire and in the USSR, the Russians were the occupiers and oppressors with regard to the other peoples who had always dreamed of liberating themselves from the imperial yoke. Such interpretation of history is not always valid, putting it mildly.

For example, Abkhazians and Ossetians have regarded the Georgians and not the Russians as invaders. The ongoing conflicts in this region in the late 1980s were provoked by Tbilisi and not Moscow. Abkhazians and Ossetians categorically refuse to be part of Georgia (just like the Kosovars do not want to live under Serbia). In general, it is hard to understand why Georgia has exercised its right to secede from the USSR while Abkhazia and South Ossetia have no right to secede from Georgia. And why should the borders drawn (often arbitrarily) by the Soviet Communist leaders be considered sacred? In particular, why should Ossetians remain a divided people forever?

The artificial Soviet borders create serious problems for almost all the former Soviet Union states. Russia should undoubtedly be smaller than the USSR, but larger than the present Russian Federation. Thus, Moscow’s current policy is not prompted by far-reaching strategic imperial designs. It is prompted partly by the necessity to give an immediate emergency response, partly by the wish to copy Western actions along with awareness that the West cannot today seriously influence Russia, and partly by the objective processes taking place in the post-Soviet space.

Russia is not a driving force behind the conflicts; all the post-Soviet conflicts have their roots in the period when modern Russia did not exist. Another and perhaps the most serious mistake of the West is identifying present-day Russia with the USSR and perceiving it as the loser in the Cold War, a country which should behave as a loser and forego its objective interests. In reality, present- day Russia emerged as a political negation of the USSR. It is in any case not a loser. It was a key stabilising force in the post-Soviet space in the 1990s.

The West’s failure to recognise these facts went a long way to provoke the appearance in Russia of psychological hark-backs to the So viet times and elements of Sovietstyle political behaviour. The West’s policy is likely to be dominated by double standards, hypocrisy and utter unwillingness to heed the opponent combined with limited military capability and very weak political will.

So, there is not much evidence to show that it will manage to effectively influence the policy of Russia and other strong countries (China, India, Iran, etc), especially since Russia’s actions in the CIS countries have considerable support among large sections of their populations. Not only Abkhazians and Ossetians, but the overwhelming majority of people in the Crimea would welcome Russian troops not as invaders, but as liberators. However, the West sees nothing but Moscow’s imperial ambitions.

The difference between the “hawks” and the “doves” is that the former want to force Russia to renounce its ambitions while the latter want to persuade it to do the same. None of them seem willing to understand that the situation is far more complex.

August 30